The Conundrum, Part 14

Did Hizbullah really miscalculate in their war against Israel? They still hold Goldwasser and Regev, with no sign of releasing them anytime soon. They still operate freely in South Lebanon and the bolstered UNIFIL forces still look the other way when Hizbullah comes rolling by because the UNIFIL forces are not living up to their obligations to disarm all the militias in Lebanon, including Hizbullah pursuant to numerous UN Security Council resolutions, including UN SCR 1701, which ended the latest war with Israel.

What followed was a 33-day war, the most devastating chapter in Lebanon's history since the civil war ended in 1990, as Hezbollah unleashed hundreds of missiles on Israel and the Israeli military shattered Lebanon's infrastructure and invaded its south. Nearly three months later, parts of the country remain a shambles and tens of thousands are still homeless as winter approaches.

In speeches and iconography, Hezbollah has cast the war as a "divine victory." But a reconstruction of the period before and soon after the seizure of the soldiers reveals a series of miscalculations on the part of the 24-year-old movement that defies its carefully cultivated reputation for planning and caution. Hezbollah's leadership sometimes waited days to evacuate the poor, densely populated neighborhood in southern Beirut that is its stronghold. Only as Israeli warplanes began reducing the headquarters to rubble did they realize the scope of what the Israeli military intended. Hezbollah fighters were still planning to train in Iran the very month that the soldiers were seized; Hezbollah leaders in Beirut had assured Lebanese officials of a relatively uneventful summer.

"They were prisoners of their assumptions," said Nizar Abdel-Kader, a retired Lebanese general.

The outcome of the war, still a matter of perceptions, reveals both the strengths and weaknesses of Hezbollah, perhaps the world's best-organized guerrilla group. The movement, even by the admission of its leaders, misjudged the Israeli response. But by virtue of its complex infrastructure and preparations — years spent digging tunnels, positioning weapons, upgrading its arsenal and carrying out surveillance along the border — Hezbollah survived.

You can't even get past the first page before finding errors. Hundreds of missiles were not launched at Israel. It was thousands. More than 4,000 in fact. And Hizbullah claims to have 20,000 more, though Israel claims that they destroyed anywhere from 30-50% of the missiles in Hizbullah's inventory.

Hizbullah thought that Israel would not respond with force against their acts of war across the Israel-Lebanon border. The acts of war were the attack that killed 8 Israeli soldiers and capture of Goldwasser and Regev.

And that part about the way the last six years were spent turning South Lebanon into Hizbullahland - complete with weapons caches and bunkers - shows that Hizbullah intended to go to war with Israel at some point, one of its own choosing. The Lebanese government was snookered, but what can they do? Hizbullah has penetrated the Lebanese government and the Lebanese military is incapable of disarming Hizbullah on its own. Their best chance was Israel doing the dirty work for them. And on that point, Israel failed because Olmert was too timid in dealing with the threats and misplayed the media war givig Hizbullah opportunitities to claim Israeli abuses where none occurred, or to exaggerate incidents that did occur.

The Lebanese military says that the would be bolstered by Hizbullah if Israel were to attack Lebanon.

The Lebanese army simultaneously commended Hizbullah's dedication in regards to implementing the demand to deploy Lebanese and UN forces in southern Lebanon.

The better the Lebanese army gets, the more comprehensive its responsibilities become and the more it can defend Lebanon from Israeli aggression, so will the need for armed militias like Hizbullah decline. This according to statements made by Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah two weeks ago. Nasrallah stated that a strong Lebanon would cancel the need for armed resistance.

But even though the Lebanese army announced that even though it would use Hizbullah north of the Litani river in an hour of need, the newspaper reports that military leaders are of the opinion that ultimately the responsibility of defending Lebanon will be theirs and not Hizbullah's. Military commanders also doubt the need for 15,000 UNIFIL soldiers to deploy in Lebanon as is specified in UN Security Council resolution 1701.

And yet the Lebanese government says that they will disarm Hizbullah. I don't buy it for one moment. It's dissembling and schizophrenic to think that the Lebanese could simultaneously disarm Hizbullah and claim that they'll use Hizbullah if necessary if Israel attacks.

The only reason Israel would attack Lebanon again is if Hizbullah attacked Israel, which is a distinct possibility since Hizbullah already proved that they would do so before, and their call to destroy Israel remains unfulfilled.

Meanwhile the Palestinian Civil War draws near, as Fatah officials say conflict is imminent. I really find it hard to feel sorry for the Palestinians and don't care who wins this fight. Neither Hamas nor Fatah seek peace with Israel. Both seek Israel's destruction, and are willing to use all the means at their disposal to do so. Hamas seeks the imminent destruction, and will not even engage in subterfuge to lull Israel into a false peace to secure its aims, whereas Fatah is more than willing to use diplomacy to do so - but even when faced with a 2-state solution (such as in 2000) cannot make that decision, and instead engaged in war.

Rockets continue to be fired into Israel from Gaza, but that doesn't appear to be newsworthy.

Israel, meanwhile, is changing the alert posture along the Golan, which suggests they think that Syria may be up to something.

Technorati: terrorism, nasrallah, fatah, Gilad, Shalit, Olmert, Eliyahu, Asheri, Ashri, Abbas, Regev, Goldwasser, PRC, Hamas, Gaza, palestinian, Israel, hizbullah, hezbullah, hezbollah, lebanon, syria.