Israel's Dilemma? Or Is It the AP's Dilemma?

Israel faces a dilemma over how to deal with the ongoing Hamas rocket attacks.

However, a bloody invasion comes with many risks, including the possible collapse of the Palestinian Authority, and sabotages Israel’s goal of separation from the Palestinians, which began with its 2005 pullout from the coastal strip. Israel’s leaders are also gun-shy after last summer’s hasty — many say botched — war against Hezbollah guerrillas in Lebanon.

That's the crux of the AP report. However, they've got some curious opinions. They seem to take the position that reduces Israel's ability to defend itself against the rocket attacks to precisely nothing. They write that if Israel goes after Hamas in a serious way, it could bring about the collapse of the Palestinian Authority (PA).

It's funny, because the AP and other media outlets was reporting as of last week the collapse of the PA as a result of the fighting between Hamas and Fatah - that Israel wouldn't even need to be involved in the fighting to bring about the complete collapse of the PA.

Now, the collapse of the PA is supposed to be a threat to prevent Israel from defending its sovereignty from terrorist attack?

There are good reasons to not engage in major fighting inside Gaza - to limit Israeli casualties. An alternative would be artillery and airstrikes 24/7 against Hamas and PIJ and Fatah targets within Gaza, and while those may result in civilian casualties, those casualties are all on the heads of the terrorists - who hide behind civilians, dress as civilians, and try to infiltrate into Israel in that fashion.

However, there are stronger reasons to engage in ground action, which relates to going after the terror cells on the ground and airstrikes simply can't get at all the bunkers and sites within Gaza.

Anyone who has been reading my ongoing coverage and analysis would know that I've been quite critical of the Olmert government and it's repeated indecision to take aggressive action, which led to the failures that we saw in Lebanon. It wasn't the Israeli military that failed; it was the failure of the leadership to take aggressive and decisive action that would lead to securing Israel's tactical and strategic objectives.

Israeli leaders thought that they could take half measures and that would be sufficient. They considered decapitation strikes against Hizbullah leadership and came up short. The Israelis also considered cutting off Hizbullah resupply, but that only came with a few days before the ceasefire agreement was imposed. The drive on the Litani River was insufficient and the resupply lines were not cut off between Hizbullah and Syria. The Bek'aa Valley remained a safe haven for Hizbullah.

Israel is in a different tactical position with Hamas in Gaza. Israel could drive up the Philadelphi corridor and cut off Gaza from the land. That's only part of the problem. Dealing with the Hamas cells and leadership means more than simply arresting Hamas members. Arrests gives other Hamas members the possibility of prisoner swaps. That's the situation we continue to see being played out over Gilad Shalit, who was taken nearly a year ago. Hamas hopes to exchange Hamas prisoners in Israeli custody for Shalit, who was taken precisely to bring about such an exchange.

Hamas has already said that it would attempt to take more Israelis hostage to ratchet up the pressure for a prisoner swap. Among those in Israeli custody are 33 Hamas leaders and many with Israeli blood on their hands.

It may be counterintuitive that by becoming stronger, Hamas may have become an easier target for Israeli forces.

And so, instead of a desperate pursuit for cells operating underground, the brawl between the IDF and Hamas is increasingly taking on the qualities of a war between two armies, where Israel enjoys much greater strength than Hamas. In such war, Hamas has no chance.

The dilemmas faced by Hamas' leadership are not simple. The security force's presence is an expression of the organization's military power, which terrifies Gaza Strip rivals and makes Hamas an element that cannot be ignored. However, this presence makes it easier for the IDF to strike the organization to the point of gravely hurting its members and weakening it considerably.

Hence, it appears these days that Hamas' security force is experiencing what the PA's official security organizations experienced when they were bombed and severely hit by the IDF – a process that allowed Hamas itself to rise to a position of power.

The question being asked now is this: Are we now seeing "closure" that would lead to a decline in Hamas' power and a return of the official security apparatuses? Time will tell.

The big caveat here is that Hizbullah also rose up from a guerrilla group to attain a position of military adequacy in an entrenched position over a period of six years that enabled them to turn South Lebanon into an armed network of bunkers and hold Israel in a standoff because of Israel's wavering stance on aggressive ground attacks against Hizbullah positions.