Monday, January 15, 2007

Backchannel Diplomacy Makes Syria-Israel Peace Plan Possible?

Is a peace plan between Syria and Israel in the works? Ha'aretz seems to think so and has produced the documents to back it up. Thus far, they're the only ones, but if this pans out, it may change the strategic calculus in the region.
In a series of secret meetings in Europe between September 2004 and July 2006, Syrians and Israelis formulated understandings for a peace agreement between Israel and Syria.

The main points of the understandings are as follows:

* An agreement of principles will be signed between the two countries, and following the fulfillment of all commitments, a peace agreement will be signed.

* As part of the agreement on principles, Israel will withdraw from the Golan Heights to the lines of 4 June, 1967. The timetable for the withdrawal remained open: Syria demanded the pullout be carried out over a five-year period, while Israel asked for the withdrawal to be spread out over 15 years.

* At the buffer zone, along Lake Kinneret, a park will be set up for joint use by Israelis and Syrians. The park will cover a significant portion of the Golan Heights. Israelis will be free to access the park and their presence will not be dependent on Syrian approval.

* Israel will retain control over the use of the waters of the Jordan River and Lake Kinneret.

* The border area will be demilitarized along a 1:4 ratio (in terms of territory) in Israel’s favor.

* According to the terms, Syria will also agree to end its support for Hezbollah and Hamas and will distance itself from Iran.

The document is described as a “non-paper,” a document of understandings that is not signed and lacks legal standing - its nature is political. It was prepared in August 2005 and has been updated during a number of meetings in Europe.
The devil is always in the details. I hope that such a deal is in the works, but one cannot depend on hope to ensure Israel's security. Syria has continued to provide material support for both Hamas and Hizbullah. Both terrorist groups threaten Israel's existence. Syria provides a conduit for weapons from Syria. Syria provides safe harbor for terrorists.

And yet, the possibility that this deal may come to fruition shows the benefits of backchannel negotiations. Forget about all the publicly hyped diplomatic missions. The ones that end up in a finished deal are the ones that start out secret - Oslo comes to mind. Oslo also comes to mind as a diplomatic solution that still has yet to be implemented by the Palestinians.

The stumbling blocks on any such deal are many - verification that Syria has stopped support of the terrorist organizations, withdrawal schedules, water rights, and threats to Syria's Bashar Assad by the Islamists in his country. The terrorists are not going to take any kind of deal lying down. They're going to go after Assad, just as they went after Sadat a generation ago.

Such a deal may help explain why Israel was so reluctant to go after the Lebanon-Syria border during the conflict with Hizbullah in August. It may also explain why Israel was so accepting of the UNIFIL deal despite the fact that the Israelis didn't appear to gain anything while leaving Hizbullah in a superior position. This could be a mitigating factor in Olmert's decision making, but should not excuse his reluctance to bring Israeli force to bear on Hizbullah. Indeed, the timing of this deal may be because Olmert needs to show some success on any possible front - and a deal with Syria could do just that.

Yet, Israelis are not likely to give up the Golan lightly. Many Israelis consider the Golan to be part of Israel - because the security it provides against a Syrian attack. This will be harshly debated in the Knesset and the nation will likely be split along party lines to agree to any deal that gives up security control on the Golan - even with a 1:4 ratio for a DMZ on the Israeli side of the pre-1967 border to the Syrian side East of the Golan Heights border.


That the details on this deal are supposedly coming out now suggests that the sides are really close to a final deal on the most complicated matters, so there is little harm in going public at this juncture. It may also reflect the fragile nature of the political situations for both Olmert and Assad. Olmert is under assault from all sides for his handling of the Hizbullah war and the ongoing conflict with Palestinians in Gaza. Assad is cut off from most of the rest of the world, and could be in deep economic trouble that a deal with Israel would resolve. It's the kind of situation that makes the timing right for a potential deal to be struck.

Right now, this is still just a piece of paper (link is to the full text of the document), but it is one that may result in settling down the situation in the North. Still, Hizbullah still has Goldwasser and Regev, and Hamas is calling for a prisoner swap - the terrorist Barghouti for Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. There are lots of obstacles here, but this could be a glimmer of hope for Israelis.

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