Zen in the Art of Diplomacy

The following is written by Dennis Ross, who was a diplomat during the Clinton Administration:

Many, including Rice, see Saudi, Israeli, Egyptian and Jordanian leaders as sharing a perception of Iran as a threat. With such common fears, the thinking goes, the leaders should be willing to accept the necessary hard compromises and end the Palestinian conflict (or show how it can be ended) so Iran can no longer exploit the conflict to build its following and put the region's moderates on the defensive.

The assessment of the common threat perception is correct. But basing policy only on this misses an important regional reality. Priorities differ on how best to respond to the Iranian threat. For the Saudis, weaning Hamas away from Iran and producing intra-Palestinian peace is more important than trying to forge peace between Palestinians and Israelis. For the Israelis, however, an intra-Palestinian peace that entails accommodating Hamas (and that does not require Hamas to change its hostile posture toward Israel) is hardly a basis for reaching out to Palestinians in a way that would satisfy the Saudis, Egyptians and Jordanians.

And one sure way to threaten intra-Palestinian peace is to push now for a political horizon that inevitably will mean Palestinian compromises on core issues such as refugees. Will Hamas accommodate giving up the Palestinian right of return? A political horizon that purports to outline the endgame will require such a concession, and Hamas is not going to accept it or a process likely to produce it.

Of course, the compromises won't be one-sided. But is Israel likely to contemplate excruciating concessions on Jerusalem or territory with a Palestinian government led in part by those who refuse to acknowledge its existence or renounce terrorism? My point is that the political options available for peacemaking between Israelis and Palestinians have been reduced. And Rice's efforts have to be guided by what is possible, not by what is most desirable.

In Middle Eastern terms, what is logical and possible is intra-Palestinian peace and Palestinian-Israeli calm. That would argue for a comprehensive cease-fire to be negotiated between Abbas and Olmert.

Where to begin with this. Palestinians and Israeli leaders do not share any commonalities. They may each claim peace, but their definitions of peace are so totally different so as to be alien.

Palestinians see peace in the form of the absence of Israel. No Israel and you have peace. It's the basis of Hamas and Fatah. Both call for Israel's destruction, and both engage in behavior and condone terrorism to further that goal.

Israelis see peace as the absence of a conflict that has been going on since 1948. They want the bullets to stop flying in their direction. They want to stop worrying about suicide bombers and building security barriers and checkpoints. They also want to stop sending their soldiers into the field to deal with Islamic terrorists who think nothing of blowing themselves up to take out as many Israelis as possible.

The Palestinians are supported by other Middle Eastern countries as a relief valve for those countries. How else to ignore the economic morass that these countries enjoy if not for the wealth that happened because they sit atop a pool of oil. The tyrants and dictators use the Palestinians as a convenient foil to blame the region's woes on Israel.

The Saudis want to balance Iranian influence, and Israel is an afterthought. They support Fatah because it counterbalances the influences of Hizbullah and Hamas that enjoys the backing of Iran. Egypt similarly does the same. Both will go out of their way to show support for Fatah because each of those countries wants to be the leading country among the Sunni Arab nations. Iran has its own agenda, and Syria follows. They want to spread Shi'a Islam, but Ross wants to display this through the prism of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The sad thing is that the Islamist conflict with Israel is not going to go away anytime soon. Ross thinks that Hamas might be willing to entertain a ceasefire with Israel. Hamas regularly engages in hudnas (strategic pauses before resuming fighting). Do not confuse the two. One could lead to peace, the other a resumption of hostilities. Just because a period of time is not considered active fighting, it does not mean that the fighting will not resume. The Islamists have dedicated their lives to destroying Israel. Being a diplomat pushing for a ceasefire just to get a signed piece of paper proclaiming peace in our time only shows the ignorance of the religious justifications and influence that it has on the political decisions by the Palestinians.

The Islamists will not willingly accede to recognizing Israel as anything other than a target for destruction. The Islamists would sooner engage in taqiya than accept Israel's existence.

A hudna is an extension of that - and even here Hamas is unwilling to concede. Hamas believes completely in the mission to destroy Israel that it will not compromise on its inalienable and central mission. It will not engage in deception to further its goal. Hamas is that dedicated to Israel's destruction.

And yet, diplomats think that a deal can be achieved?

Sorry, but without common ground, there can be no deal.