Tracking Zarqawi, Hits, and Iraq

Kevin Drum notes that the longstanding story that the US had a bead on Zarqawi in 2002 and chose not to act appears to have been confirmed by Michael Scheuer, who used the psuedonym Anonymous when writing about his experiences at the CIA as the head of the unit hunting down Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda.

Two years ago, Jim Miklaszewski of NBC News reported that a few months after 9/11 the Pentagon drafted multiple plans to hit the camp of Abu Musab Zarqawi, the al-Qaeda terrorist who had taken up residence in Iraq's northern no-fly zone, outside Saddam Hussein's control. George Bush, however, refused to authorize a military strike.

I've written about this multiple times (I used to jokingly called it my "monthly Zarqawi post"), but Miklaszewski's story always had a big problem: it was based on anonymous sources, which made it easy for the White House to ignore. Today, however, the Australian show Four Corners has gotten confirmation of the story from Michael Scheuer, former head of the CIA's Osama bin Laden unit...

This is an interesting revelation, and poses some interesting questions. Why did the Administration choose not to strike against Zarqawi in 2002? Perhaps the reason had to do with a complete change in emphasis - instead of taking out the individual terrorists within a country that was providing shelter and ostensible aid, the aim was to eliminate the regime supporting terrorism at the same time. The problem was the execution of that plan, and the delays due to diplomatic maneuvering.

If one recalls the resolutions authorizing military force against Iraq, one has to note that they included statements about Iraq's ongoing support for international terrorism. Thus, firing a couple of missiles at Zarqawi's compound in Iraq might have eliminated Zarqawi, but not the larger problem of Iraq being used as a terror base of operations.

It is curious that Drum notes that Zarqawi was in the Kurdish controlled portion Iraq, and that one of the arguments suggested that Bush chose not to attack Zarqawi was because it bolstered the contention that Saddam was harboring terrorists (as if the terror training facilities at Salman Pak or numerous ties with other international terrorists who were openly and covertly supported by Saddam, weren't enough?) The recognition that Zarqawi was operating freely in Iraq should bolster the fact that al Qaeda was operating in Iraq, and the question remains just how much contact al Qaeda and the Iraqi regime had - coordinating operations in Iraq before and after the invasion in 2003. Some of those questions are being addressed in the examination of the documents released by the Dept. of Defense - and seemingly bolster the contention of coordination.

Such a strike could have undermined the US ability to assemble a coalition to topple Saddam and therefore one has to consider the geopolitical situation when evaluating the potential strike against Zarqawi.

While Clinton fired missiles at various targets around Iraq in 1998 and fired missiles at 'empty tents,' Bush chose to wait to hit at the regime enabling Zarqawi and al Qaeda to be encamped within Iraq - hitting not just the terrorists, but the regime permitting their presence. That attack finally came in 2003, giving al Qaeda and the Ba'athists months to prepare for the coming fight. If anything, it was the delay due to attempting diplomatic solutions that gave Zarqawi time to get his deadly plans in motion.

In other words, one should question what would have happened had the US engaged in the diplomatic route only to lob missiles against Iraq anyway. The same people who are complaining about how Bush didn't act to eliminate Zarqawi when he ostensibly had the chance, would then complain that the US was trying to precipitate a war by going after al Qaeda in Iraq. Circular logic to be sure, but that's what this line of thought can be reduced to. The Administration was trying to break through the circular reasoning by going after the sponsors of terrorism, not just the terrorists themselves.

There's also the question of whether the US might have eliminated Zarqawi had the US managed to open a Northern front via Turkey for the 4th ID. The battle plan had called for a 2 pronged assault to Baghdad, with the 4th ID sweeping in from Turkey. That would have meant that significant US ground forces would have swept through the very areas that Zarqawi was supposedly operating from and increased the likelyhood that the US forces would have eliminated him. The problem was that Turkey couldn't be persuaded to let US forces base from Turkey because they were worried that liberating Iraq might give the Turkish Kurds other ideas (like declaring themselves free).

Yet, for all their preparations, and despite the violence that we've seen, al Qaeda is losing Iraq just as surely as they've lost in Afghanistan. Tigerhawk urges caution, but notes that blowback occurs in all organizations, whether a government or a terrorist group.

Tigerhawk, posting over at Belmont Club [ed: corrected attribution from Wretchard to Tigerhawk; sorry Tiger!] notes, however, that al Qaeda's jihadi visions of world domination will continue to circulate until their views are completely discredited.

It is therefore important to kill or capture al Qaeda veterans. Yes, others will spring up as long as the ideology remains sufficiently credible to attract new blood. But -- and this is a huge "but" -- the new recruits will take time to train (especially now that Afghanistan is interdicted) and an even longer time to earn the leadership's trust. Every new recruit is a potential spy, and will not soon be trusted with weapons of mass destruction (of which more in a moment) even if the network acquires them in deployable form.

At least until the end of the petroleum era, the interests of the United States in the Middle East are so deep that it will not be driven away by garden-variety terrorism. Even multiple bombings such as in London or Madrid would not do it. Only massive casualties might provoke a revision of American policy in the region. Everything else would stiffen American resolve rather than erode it.

Mass casualty attacks are tough to conceive, plan and execute. After September 11, they are even tougher for people who do not blend in well in the West. This means that well-trained Westernized jihadis are even more valuable than they were.

Kill the veterans, and the terrorists taking their place will have a far more difficult time.

AJ Strata notes that al Qaeda is being forced to expend more effort on publishing its communiques than engaging in planning for mass casualty attacks - given the ongoing campaign by the Pakistanis against al Qaeda along the border, the Afghan forces ongoing fight against the Taliban and al Qaeda remnants, and the Iraqi al Qaeda contingent getting pounded on a daily basis by Task Force 145.