The Generals' Revolt

Reading through these stories of how there are now an increasing number of generals who are critical of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, I can't help but recall the history lesson of the Admirals' revolt.

The year was 1949. The US had just finished winning World War II. The War Department had just been reorganized into the Department of Defense and the Air Force had been separated from the Army into its own distinct branch. Funding for the various branches became a major sticking point and funding was tied to doctrine. The Air Force saw itself as the preeminent branch because it could drop the bomb. The Army sided with the Air Force (the ties that bind), and the Navy had its own ideas.

The Navy saw itself as having the ability to throw the largest amount of force against any target anywhere in the world because of its aircraft carriers - a strategy that worked out extremely well in the cauldron of the Pacific campaign. So, the Navy sought a new generation of aircraft carrier to handle the mission as they perceived it. CV-58. The USS United States. A supercarrier. The project was killed a month after Secretary of Defense Forrestal stepped down for health reasons.

The air force disliked the Navy because the carriers were an air force beyond their control and Secretary of Defense Johnson sided with the air force in the debate, and had thrown his support behind the B-36 bomber program. Instead of being partners in US national security and national defense, the service branches became competitors - a situation that remains to this day.

The revolt was a confluence of money, power, mission, tactics, and how the Secretary of Defense is supposed to manage competing interests. The 1949 revolt of the admirals shows just how bad things can get when a Secretary of Defense runs against the will of one of the branches. It can get nasty.

The question one has to ask of themselves now, is whether these generals are saying anything other than what those admirals were saying in 1949? Are they disputing the Secretary of Defense because their own pet projects have been killed or because they have actual genuine disagreements with the Secretary over issues of tactics and strategy.

Rumsfeld is a polarizing figure, and his transformative role in how the military should be organized to fight quickly and project force swiftly, including a rise in the emphasis of special forces, is bound to rub generals the wrong way. The Army is tied to tank warfare - and tanks rely on the Navy or Air Force to get where they need to go. It's time consuming and while US tanks are supreme on the battlefield, if the fight takes place too quickly for them to be fielded, they do no one any good.

From the Times:

Among the retired generals who have called for Mr. Rumsfeld's ouster, some have emphasized that they still believe it was right for the United States to invade Iraq. But a common thread in their complaints has been an assertion that Mr. Rumsfeld and his aides too often inserted themselves unnecessarily into military decisionmaking, often disregarding advice from military commanders.

The outcry also appears based in part on a coalescing of concern about the toll that the war is taking on American armed forces, with little sign, three years after the invasion, that United States troops will be able to withdraw in large numbers anytime soon.

Pentagon officials, while acknowledging that Mr. Rumsfeld's forceful style has sometimes ruffled his military subordinates, played down the idea that he was overriding the advice of his military commanders or ignoring their views.
His interaction with military commanders has "been frequent," said Lawrence Di Rita, a top aide to Mr. Rumsfeld.

One of the things that is notable is that some of these complaints are about the politicization of the military tactics and strategy. Instead of fighting to win, it's a claim that political goals are being inserted. That's a recipe for disaster, and one can't help but wonder how much of this is the fault of the ongoing schism between the leftwing anti-war push to end the war and bring the troops home quickly. That pull has forced the Administration to adjust its policies, perhaps to the detriment of the overall mission in Iraq. And some of the ruffled feathers are due to the fact that Rumseld has overseen killing numerous projects (Crusader for one) that would have been a major portion of the US Army procurement over the next decade.

Doctrinal differences may lead to hurt feelings, and broken careers. However, do these questions signify something more. Rumsfeld has overseen the Department since 2000. He's overseen the US response to 9/11 and brought about the liberation of 50 million people in Afghanistan and Iraq, sometimes using unorthodox measures (special forces and light troops in Afghanistan) and being forced to use smaller forces than necessary in Iraq (does anyone actually remember that the US battle plan was supposed to have the 4th ID enter Iraq from Turkey to meet up with the coalition forces coming into Iraq from the South and West?) Since 2003, criticism has continued to mount over Rumseld's style and decision making. We know that the Adminsitration is quite loyal, perhaps to a fault. So, dumping Rumseld would be a huge step - and the Administration does not want that to be perceived as a repudiation of the strategy and tactics used - failure is not an option.

Others blogging: The Political PitBull, Outside the Beltway, The Moderate Voice who has a great roundup of opinions, Just One Minute, John Cole, and Big Lizards is unimpressed.