Able Danger: Another Brick in the Wall

Andy McCarthy has some insider knowledge about the infamous wall, having worked in Mary Jo White's office when she was prosecuting the WTC bombers. I think you should go read his article in its entirety as it touches on many of the salient points of Able Danger, data collection, data preservation, and what the Pentagon has been doing in the investigation into what Able Danger did, and why the 9/11 Commission excluded all mention of the program from its report.

In the Information Era, the world is increasingly small. Thus, in the course of carrying out those missions, it frequently happens that DoD intelligence services will incidentally capture information about U.S. persons. Does that mean these services need to shed that information, even if it could be vital to our safety?

Of course not. The whole point of the governing regulations is to allow the military to keep intelligence that might save American lives. Thus, Dugan conceded that the rules set forth 13 broad reasons for retaining information about U.S. persons. They are worth setting out, as Dugan did in his submitted testimony:

1. Information obtained with consent.

2. Publicly available information.

3. Foreign intelligence.

4. Counterintelligence.

5. Potential sources of assistance to intelligence activities.

6. Protection of intelligence sources and methods.

7. Physical security. [with a foreign nexus/connection]

8. Personnel security.

9. Communications security.

10. Narcotics. [international narcotics activity]

11. Threats to safety. [with a foreign nexus/connection — such as international terrorist organizations]

12. Overhead reconnaissance.

13. Administrative purposes. [training records — a narrowly drawn category].

There are few of these categories that would not provide, by themselves, a justification to maintain intelligence gathered on U.S. persons in the course of tracking an international terrorist organization and its members who were in the process of plotting to mass murder American civilians and military personnel. And that's leaving aside that the information we are talking about was, for the most part, actually gathered from publicly available information (a justifying category unto itself — see, No.2, above)

So, al Qaeda and Atta did not even trigger U.S. person concerns, and even if they had there would have been abundant rationales for retaining the Able Danger harvest (not to mention getting it into the FBI's hands). Why, then, was vital intelligence purged?

The answer has nothing to do with the regulations. It's all about mindset. The suicide ethos.

AJ Strata has more on the Stephen Hadley's curious statements and comments on Able Danger. One is left wondering whether the admission by the Pentagon that the program exists, and the 720 on permitting employees to testify has anything to do with Weldon securing funding for a new and improved Able Danger so that this issue will die a media death and the Pentagon can carry on in the business of intel gathering.

The problem is that the American people need to know whether anything has changed since 9/11 and the 9/11 Commission's report's findings would be inaccurate if Able Danger was indeed priescent in determining Atta and other 9/11 hijackers in advance of the attack.

Technorati: Able Danger, weldon, and 9/11