Able Danger: Congress To Act?

It would seem that there is enough smoke present in the Able Danger mess to get Congress interested. The Senate is considering hearings this fall, which will investigate the matter more fully.

It's sad that we had to learn of this program after the 9/11 Commission finished its report, and it would seem that any number of factors played a role in its omission from the report. Hopefully the Senate investigation might touch on that aspect of this situation. However, I would hope that the Senate focuses in on the actual program itself, what it may have accomplished, and what led its data to be spiked before it could be presented to those who could act on it.

The former chairman of the Sept. 11 commission said in a telephone interview that he believes the onus is on the Pentagon to do a speedy evaluation of the claims by Shaffer and others that lead hijacker Mohamed Atta (search) and three other hijackers had been identified one year before the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks.

"The files are in the possession of the Defense Department, so really nobody else besides the administration can get to the bottom of it ... if there exists a file on Able Danger," said Chairman Tom Kean.

Tom Kean is doing a fine job of shifting the blame on Able Danger away from his Commission and to the Pentagon. Sorry, but I don't buy it, not when the Commission was supposedly informed on several occasions of the existence of Able Danger and that its data mining techniques had unearthed the names of four of the 19 terrorists, including Mohammed Atta. Jim Geraghty also finds Kean's comments wanting, especially when Shaffer's statements support the naval officer's statements, which would give the preponderance of the evidence in favor of the Commission having been informed of Able Danger and that the Commission failed to act on it.

While making no judgment on the veracity of the claims, former commissioner Tim Roemer said inconsistencies are appearing between the story and the facts that the commission knows.

For one, Roemer asked how Able Danger got a photo of Atta in 2000 for its alleged chart of terrorists when he had not yet applied for a U.S. visa.

"If Atta's name is mentioned, you send off a host of fire alarms, neon lights, people's hair gets on fire and you're going to find out what that's all about. But you also need evidence, you can't just say here's my recollection of something I thought I saw in a notebook. You've got to say, 'Here is the chart,'" Roemer said.

Roemer has an interesting point about the ability of Able Danger to have the photo of Atta in 2000. However, it is possible that the photo was acquired using the same kinds of open source data mining that elicited the name in the first place. This is just one more question that needs to be addressed, but should have been addressed by the Commission before issuing the final report.

The Pentagon is investigating the lawyers involved in the Able Danger process. As they rightfully should. They're looking into who was involved in the Pentagon side decision making process during the Clinton Administration when the Able Danger information was being compiled.

However, this investigation should have taken place concurrent with the information to be presented to the Commission. This is a foulup on their part too. The Pentagon needs to figure out why this information was not presented to the Commission in a more forceful and coherent fashion. Was the data not as convincing as Weldon and Shaffer claim, or are aspects of the data mining techniques classified, which limits what can be said on the subject. Shaffer seems to think that there were classified portions of the program, which he said was one of the reasons behind the delay in going public.

It must be restated that Shaffer was not on the Able Danger team, but acted only as a liason to the program. His comments advance the story, but they do not confirm every aspect of the story.

Andy McCarthy also notes the problems raised by Roemer, and that Shaffer had his security clearance pulled, but the circumstances behind that are unclear. Those are attacks on the character of the witnesses, not the evidence itself. However, Andy also comments that the Pentagon may be preparing a statement to say that they did not identify Atta, though nothing has been made official. More information is needed to determine the veracity of the evidence.

Meanwhile, Dafydd of Captains' Quarters speculates on Jaime Gorelick's job history, especially since she was a DoD General Counsel before she became the #2 at the DoJ. That means that her policies may have set in motion the DoD side of the wall of separation, which was advanced during her run at DoJ from the law enforcement side.

UPDATE:
Is this the source of the Able Danger confusion over Atta? Are there two Attas? It is plausible, but without knowing what the Able Danger team actually found, there's no way to know, nor is there any way to know what databases and public information was used. A Nexis search did produce the Abu Nidal terrorist Atta from a 1981 story, but that doesn't mean that is the end of the story. That, my friends, is in the details to be discovered.